ABSTRACT Dark Deleuze (University of Minnesota Press, 2016) appears as an anomaly in English Deleuze scholarship. Andrew Culp contrasts Deleuze as a thinker of positivity who constantly demands we nd "reasons to believe in this world" with a Deleuze of dark negativity. In doing so, Culp offers an alternative Deleuze in a time where powerful forces from Buzzfeed to the IDF seek to appropriate Deleuze's thought. The Dark Deleuze speaks of destructive negativity, hatred for this world, and the shame of being human. All of these ideas are pit against "the canon of joy" that would have us relentlessly celebrate the new, af rm the present, and give in to compulsory positivity. Culp makes a powerful case that, contrary to what one might expect, it is precisely the positivity that lies at the heart of both liberal and accelerationist readings of Deleuze.
The Dark Deleuze project takes a different year of revolution as its point of departure:
1989. Most only think of it as the year of the fall of the Berlin Wall, but 1988 Wall, but /1989 marked the rst mass economic summit protests in Berlin and Paris. Just a couple years later, the rst commercial Internet Service Providers came online. This period coincides with the political uptake of Deleuze and Guattari in North America. (Parenthetically, I should add that there were other versions before that, namely "schizo-culture" which is way too acid for my taste.) The D&G of anti-globalization emphasized the importance of the rhizome, as seen in its many names: "the movement of movements, " "a global network, " "a world where many worlds are possible. " This is really when the notion of "think global, act local" solidi ed, and there were a number of global convergences that fused into "alter-globalization" that is also called "the global justice movement. " These characterizations never completely sat right with me-the World Social Forum and other attempts to do "globalization from below" still seemed too tied to liberal democratic notions of global governance, populist socialist principles of people power, and a rather dull interpretation of communism.
My project is inspired by another current that ows through the anti-globalization period:
left-communism and so-called nihilist anarchism. Moreover, it is an intellectual trajectory that takes a distance from its prehistory, which goes back at least to the 19th and early 20th century. There's already plenty of ink on those heretical communists, Max Stirner, and non-soviet political experiments. For me, there is clearly an epistemological break in the mid-20th century that coincides with the New Left, Situationism, Post-Structuralism, Autonomia, and other movements that step outside of the long shadow cast by organization and will. It is the radical thought/practice that emerges from this break that interests me the most. So a key reference point is Fredy Perelman and Red and Black Press, who promoted a unique intersection of Situationist, left-communist, and insurrectionary anarchist materials that make up a lesser-known current of American anarchism. Other references in that mix include Anarchy: A Journal of Desire Armed, Jacques Camatte, Gilles Dauvé, Tiqqun, and Claire Fontaine. Furthermore, while I enjoy speaking to others who know the older history of council communism, philosophical debates among the Young Hegelians, or other historical material, I think the last few decades have been innovative enough to keep us from paying our dues to old white movements that largely failed.
With that being said, what does this look like on the practical level?
Practice? A lot depends on the question of how to ght from where you stand. Broadly, I
think Dark Deleuze turns away from both mass movement building and Leninist notions of politics. In other places I've spoken about "the shadow of Lenin, " namely the primacy of organization in social change, the role of blueprinting models for a new society, and the need for vanguardist leadership to promote education/discipline. I am not trying to be unfair to the legacy of Lenin, who managed to do something far grander than us. Yet I think that radical politics is stuck in a fundamentally sociological mode. This is why so many anti-Leninists are still trapped in his shadow, such as anarcho-syndicalists who think that democratic process is the solution to our political ills. Maybe I am just rehashing the Foucault-Chomsky debate here! So as Baudrillard once suggested we "forget Foucault, " my proposition is to "forget Lenin" and the sociological dimension of politics that his approach implies.
On a more personal level, I have also shifted to thinking of myself as a lifer. The consequences are pretty signi cant. I now embrace our insigni cance in the grand scheme of things, have jettisoned moralist/guilt-based politics, and now prefer to work with likeminded folks. Believing in your own insigni cance seems integral for managing the libidinal economy of participation. The emotional politics of urgency-relief that drive most people to feel good simply for "doing something" like marching at a rally is the drug of choice for most community organizers. Early on, it can be easy to get hooked on the emotional rollercoaster. But if you stick around long enough, it is important to get wise.
The same can be said about moralist politics. The added caveat being that call-out culture has the same basic dynamics of war communism, which makes it as equally unsustainable.
The question of working with like-minded people is a thorny one. Brie y, I do not believe in mass movement building. Yet I also do not like lifeboat politics that only works for the bene t of me-and-mine. As you know, there is a body of literature on "the politics of friendship, " including Derrida's critique of the friendship that philosophy inherits from the Greeks as patriarchal. I have personally tried to think through the problematic through a quote from Guattari, who when writing about his relationship to Deleuze, once said that There's a reason this con ict of interpretation exists. De ned for so long as the thinker of difference, Deleuze appears to stand at the crossroads of Marxism and liberalism. Some thinkers even argue that Deleuze eliminates the forced choice between the two schools of thought. The image of this argument usually goes as such: the problem with capitalism is not that it is too liberal, but rather, not liberal enough. In form, it is a dialectical variation on the old stagist argument that communism comes into existence by following the historical transition of feudalism into capitalism into socialism into communism. The liberals agree that capitalism rides on the coattails of the bourgeois revolution. Yet they place a liberal version of social democracy at the end of the sequence. A curious conclusion given that the liberal concept of selfhood is premised on property ownership ("possessive individualism") that most Marxists intend to abolish along with the capitalism.
More abstractly, the "liberal Marxist" interpretation of Deleuze tracks back to the modernist aspiration for novelty, creativity, and the production of the new. Like Marx and Engels say in The Communist Manifesto, capitalism initiates unparalleled revolutionary change (tearing asunder sedimented social codes, melting everything solid into air) but unfortunately this revolutionary potential is geared exclusively toward privatizing its products in the hands of the few. Liberalism rears its head with how this state of affairs is critiqued. What is wrong with capitalism? If you think capitalism causes rootlessness, you are probably a neo-traditionalist. If you think capitalism divides us, you are most likely a brocialist. And if you think capitalism is wasteful, you could be a liberal Marxist. Just look at the Keynesian Marxism of Sweezy and Baran in Monopoly Capitalism, the Maoist focus on the "productive forces" evolving past capitalism's fetters, and other productivist accounts (sometimes including New Materialism, to the extent that it remains Marxist).
Each are different logical conclusions of the modernist xation on the production of the new. We can then summarize "liberal Marxists" as those who believe that capitalism is not creative enough. DeLanda is interesting. He is many people's gateway into Deleuze, and for that, the lucidity of his concrete examples are heartily appreciated. Yet his method is his problem.
Deleuze moves from the abstract to the concrete, beginning with Virtual Ideas (also known as abstract machines) as what structures the real. This is philosophy as de ned by him and Guattari in What is Philosophy?, the in nite speed of thought that is not caught up in slowness of any concrete state of affairs. DeLanda's method is the opposite; he always moves from the concrete to the abstract. In that sense, he is a crude materialist who actively denies the power of philosophy. The most signi cant consequence for me is that he empties out the space of politics.
In more philosophical terms, DeLanda is guilty of the same crime as most social theorists:
by placing ontology before politics, he allows his own image of "what is" to foreclose the utopian dimension of politics that provokes radical transformation. Take for example his A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History (1997). The book is a dangerously persuasive tracking of how small changes accrete over time. On a banal level, it feeds into the molecular story of politics loved by Deleuzian liberals: that the small victories of incrementalism are even more decisive than those who demand wholesale change. His work has even been used by the pesky "realists" who pour cold water on us by saying we need to learn more about how the system works before trying to change it, or that we are asking for too much, too fast. In a grander sense, what is lost is the whole role of the virtual and its relationship to the future as a force driven by the great unknown. So in I abandoned an essay on Nick Land a few months ago, feeling that his ideas have gotten far more exposure than they deserve. This will probably be the last time I will mention him before no-platforming him. There are some useful kernels in Land's work during the Cybernetic Cultures Research Unit he headed up at Warwick in the 1990s; he has turned into something worse than a fascist. I would not discourage anyone from reading his monograph on Bataille, Thirst for Annihilation (1990), or any of the essays collected in Fanged Noumena (2011). Though I could not recommend either in good conscience without adding the caveat that they could be a roadmap to hyper-conservative thought.
If we step back from any one argument, Land is clearly a case study in paranoia-becometext. He tarries with many demons that do not really exist. And for the ones that do, he affords them far greater weight than they truly hold. His two favorite conspiracies are the academy and technology. Yes, he was drummed out of the university. But he was kicked out for acting like an antisocial fool, not intellectual blasphemy. If anything, the university unfortunately had more tolerance for his behavior than nearly any other type of workplace. Sure, universities have become more aggressive in enforcing their drug-free and sexual harassment policies. That hardly means that "The Cathedral" controls the globe through ideological programming. The great irony is how little in uence academia really has on the world -my students are far more inculcated in popular culture than any discourse I introduce to them. Alternatively, let us consider his techno anti-humanism. Are computers cold, dead machines trying to kill humanity as we know it? Nah. And I am perplexed at him laying this notion at the feet of Deleuze and Guattari. For those somehow not familiar with [Donna] Haraway's cyborg manifesto, it is clear that D&G don't believe in some outdated natural/synthetic dichotomy. In fact, one of the foundational claims of D&G's take on technology is that machines are social before they are technical.
In summary, the hermeneutic key to understanding all of Land is that he has the persecution complex of a narcissist. He wants nothing more than to be The Bad Guy. His willingness to switch political sides has nothing to do with embracing darkness in an extramoral sense. He will do anything to remain the center of attention. That is why he trucks in fringe theories. This makes him more a psychoanalytic subject pathologically xated on transgressing The Law, not some dark saint of materialism.
My own thoughts on escape are a recon guration of "the line of ight. " My dissertation, which I titled Escape, was an attempt to change how we think about line of ight. The concept has long been thought of as a literary/creative ight of fancy, transversal connections between social groups, or line of subjective becoming. I remain faithful to the concepts in the Capture plateau and the anthropology chapter of Anti-Oedipus. In both, the line of ight is the means through which one social form transforms into another.
"Capture" is the means through which states control lines of ight. This latter point is so important to D&G that they argue that societies should not be categorized according to their mode of production but their mode of prevention (here we nd an interesting coincidence with [Alain] Badiou's concept of the event as a prevent). The task of escape is then about nding the lines of force that force a social form into decomposition.
The "end of the world" is both philosophically important but also a cognitive map of popular conceptions about revolution. A hundred years ago, revolution was represented through anxieties over the death of god as explored through Modernism. Now we have apocalyptic tales. The interesting thing is that most of the stories take place after the apocalypse. What we can take from this is that the end of the world does not mean that everything ends, but rather, everything changes. Yet the disappointing thing about most apocalyptic ction is about how little changes. So as Fredric Jameson has argued, in popular culture, it is easier to imagine an end of the world than the end of capitalism. The characters wander barren lands wrought by environmental catastrophe yet key tenets of capitalism remain, whether they be private property, wage-labor, the class-relation, or something else. Worst of all, most of them are thought experiments in what undergirds society, the necessities that cannot be jettison when we can no longer afford the wasteful luxuries of art, paci sm, anti-racism, women's lib, or other things that have de ned the New Left. Part of the project of thinking the end of the world is using the contemporary raw material of thinking revolution, apocalyptic ctions, to write new apocalypses that are more to our liking. This is where Sun Ra's afro-futurism comes into play. Consider his lm The Space of the Place (1974)-it would be easy to mistake Ra's cosmic perspective as offering a survey of space as a solution, yet the heart of the dramatic con ict is over how best to destroy the Earth. In this case, it is neither the journey nor the destination that matters in the end.
Philosophically, each of the three deaths I mention match each of Kant's three critiques. I haven't worked through this as much as Gregg Flaxman, who covers the in the conclusion That's the question. I come from an anti-organizational, anti-programmatic anarchist tradition, so not that! There are plenty of people who suggested to me, with a wink and a nudge, "it's really a mix of the Dark and the Joyous that you want in the end, right?" I would rather not give them the satisfaction. In Dark Deleuze, I mean it when I say that the dark and the joyous are contrasts, forks in the road, alternatives. I genuinely hope we replace the joyous with the dark. Positivity and creativity do not need to be denounced, but I think they should no longer serve as motivating ideas.
After the end of the world? Well, for me: the end of capitalism is tied to the coming of communism. By that, I mean the abolition [of] private property, work, and all of the intolerable forms of oppression it enables (patriarchy, racism, ableism).
Conversations
It is de nitely true that creativity and positivity for themselves have to be tossed out.
Whitehead's creativity suffers a similar fate as Deleuze and Guattari's autoproduction.
There are many who take novelty and treat it as if it is a good thing in itself, but the advance into novelty is just a state of affairs we can't do away with, not something good or bad.
Many people express this issue through the phrase "confusing ontology for politics. " This is especially an issue for Deleuze, as his use of Spinoza often blurs the line between an account of what is and a judgment on what is good. There is a rather at-footed reading of Deleuze's Spinozism whereby any collection of things that come together into an assemblage is a joyous encounter of bodies-everything else is just sad passions. There is even a funny way of reading the Geology of Morals plateau this way. So absurd! Those who read it this way just need to continue a few plateaus later to nd Deleuze and Guattari railing against molar segmentarities and megamachines, arguing that large collections are fascist. I lay some of the blame at the feet of the "post-critical" turn in which some theorists have suggested that critique has failed and all we have left is constructivism. Latour is at the forefront of this. Perhaps this is why Deleuze and Guattari have to follow up A Thousand Plateaus with What is Philosophy? which promotes a de nition of philosophy that exceeds a state of affairs. Though we were already told about this at the end of the Rhizome plateau, when they declare an end to ontology.
